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Abstract 
This paper is intended to promote a way of is-ought derivation, rooted in neonaturalistic 
solutions which were worked out within the scope of both the ontology of values  
and meta-ethical applications of 20th Century linguistic philosophy. Normative, especially  
in the sphere of morality, reasoning is supposed to be the most significant component  
of the structure of social communication. The common practices of normative persuasion 
employ a variety of modes of argumentation, such as the usage of evaluations, norms, 
imperatives, performative utterances, prescriptions, and optatives. There is a wide range  
of kinds of emotive pressure produced by speech acts, behind which some intentions  
of perlocutionary effects are hidden, and which all have methodologically differentiated status. 
Therefore, the ability to recognize some tricks employed in such practices, as well as  
the qualifed faculty of argumentaion for and validation of one‟s own moral convictions ems  
to be an indispensable component of a subject‟s high cultural competncy. The moral 
responsibility for social states-of-affairs generated by speech acts requires such competency. 
The neonaturalistic approach – itself representing cognitive meta-ethics and recognizing  
the pragmatic functions of speech acts as a social phenomenon – proposes a philosophical 
alternative to the cage of formalized languages (like various systems of deontic logic)  
for normative reasoning in order to find real, verifiable – not necessarily of contractual origin – 
value-referred premises for the inference of socially applied judgments of duty. The distinction 
between logical validation and moral (value-referred) justification of imperatives  
is emphasized at the same time. On this account certain philosophical interpretations  
of the categories of “fact”, “value” and “personal agent of valuation and cogniton” are caried 
out and an example of is-ought inference is presented. 
1 The semiotics of the problem 
My initial question concerns the purpose of normative discourse, where the “normative” can mean 
(i) discourse employing evaluative statements, appraisals, judgments of duty, norms, orders, 
prohibtions, prescriptions etc; (i) “refred to values”; (i) “refred to a socially -set -up 
benchmark or pattern”. Can the purpose be suposed as being, e.g., truth, social agreement on what 
should be done, the determination of records of differences of opinions, rightness, or the efficiency 
of social influence effected by means of the speech act? From the perspective of meta-ethics, 
comprehended as the hermeneutics of normative discourse – both common and professional  
(i.e. as the language as well as argumentation employed within theoretical-ethical deliberations) – 
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there are two distinctive opposite interpretations about what the discourse really is, or what  
it consists in: the cognitive and non-cognitive ones. Naturalism used to be indicated as an example 
of the former, and emotivism as an example of the latter. 
The cognitive standpoint claims that our discussions or quarrels within the normative spheres of 
social consciousness and practice – like morality – aim at the determination of the truth/falsity  
of is-statements (like evaluations) or rightness/wrongness of ought-propositions. On the contrary, 
non-cognitivism interprets our moral discourse not as a dispute about truth but as an intentional 
strategic and performative play. We don‟t realy want to convince anybody that a given  
state-of affairs or human action was good, wrong, noble or nasty, at all; instead we want  
to force our convictions and approvals/disapprovals on others and to implant in them emotions 
similar to ours, and finally make them behave as we want them to. In other words,  
it is an opposition between semantic and pragmatic interpretations of the discourse then.  
The truth, requiring a definite methodological discipline to be determined, is the main value which 
the cognitivists aim at, while the social efficiency of speech acts, operating with normative 
utterances, is the purpose of the non-cognitivists. What is more important then: truth or social effect? 
An act of communication (especially discussion) can be understood as a kind of social action 
which is aiming at perlocutive consequences. Speech acts make for social interactions and pressure, 
so it apparently seems that the pragmatic perspective and practice of argumentation does not 
require any special logical discipline in order to be conducted in a socially effective way.  
Can we then put aside the fundamental logical problem of the is-ought distinction and say that any 
argument (including a nonverbal one) is correct and acceptable if it can make someone do what 
someone else wants? Is it methodologically as well as morally acceptable to employ any persuasive 
way of moving from the Is to the Ought in order to make others – by means of words – behave  
as we prefer? 
Meta-ethical neonaturalism claims that the contrary is the case: the logical correctness (formal 
validity) of normative reasoning (justification) is the crucial condition for this reasoning  
to be socially accepted and, as such, causing a performative effect. This is the logical correctness  
of a reasoning that makes any arguments employed convincing and socially effective  
in inducing human conduct. The logical correctness of argumentation seems to be the best 
instrument for generating perlocutive effects, or the best persuasive agent in social action by means  
of language. The methodologically correct determination of truth or rightness of a normative 
statement makes the best pragmatic factor for the statement being socially acceptable  
by sufficiently educated  participants in normative discourse, respecting the rules of rationality 
being a necessary condition of a functional social cooperation. It must be remembered, however, 
that the logical correctness of reasoning itself does not determine the epistemic status (e.g. material 
truthfulness) either of premises or conclusions. 
2 The introduction of the neonaturalistic perspective 
From the radical neonaturalistic perspective, as I identify my standpoint, I would like to prove that 
a logicaly corect pasage from “is” to “ought” is posible, and even beter justifed than wel 
known J. Searle‟s solution, thanks to philosophical operations performed on the categories  
of “fact”, “value” and “subject (agent) of valuation as wel as cogniton. Neonaturalism recognizes 
both the category of truth/falsity as attributable to normative is-propositions (like evaluations)  
and rightness/wrongness to ought-conclusions (norms, orders). In order to construct logically 
proper and verifiable/falsifiable argumentation that does not commit the naturalistic fallacy,  
it is necessary both to find an ontological possibility for an empirical fact to be a normative one  
and to make the participants of a discourse abstract
1
; also a set of transcendental (pan-individual  
as well as pan-specific) values that can underlie the methodologically proper attribution of rights  
as well as duties to entities making up the universe of valuation (axiosphere) becomes an aim  
                                                   
 
1 For the main ideas and terminology of radical neonaturalism see: (Wawrzyniak 2000)  
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of philosophical investigation. Neonaturalistic ontology does away with the dichotomous division 
of reality into spheres of values and facts. Values can be made actual provided that they  
are understood as empirical facts. 
If we want to remain faithful to methodological requirements that D. Hume, G.E. Moore,  
and I. Kant forced on acceptable normative reasoning, we cannot fail to work out models of correct 
<is – ought> argumentation. One of them is the application of a system of deontic logic as a special 
language in which we conduct our reasoning; the second approach – represented by J. Searle –  
is such a reinterpretation of the premises of normative reasoning, as well as the layers and functions 
of speech acts, which would allow us to derive an ought-conclusion from the set of is-premises; the 
third way, promoted by radical neonaturalism, is based on some typically philosophical solutions
2
. 
John Searle was trying, on the basi of J. Austin‟s philosophy of language, to prove that  
the is – ought derivation is possible within the universe of linguistic (logical) operations 
themselves. My proposal suggests that the derivation (justification) of normative conclusions,  
i.e. a reasoning starting with certain is-statements about what the world is like and ending with 
ought-conclusions about  what human activity within it should be like, is possible thanks  
to reference to the ontology of values – and not only to the intrinsic coherency of linguistic 
operations – as to a benchmark for the main premises of normative reasoning. 
3 Being and Oughtness 
The traditonal understanding of the distinction betwen “being” (resp. a fact) and “oughtnes” 
(resp. a value) implies the mode of existence of a value as a pure obligation, which makes  
this category inconsistent: a valued state-of-affairs is supposed to be a value provided it is never 
actualized as a fact
3
. So, values get the paradoxical status of non-beings. The more, claiming  
that values are ex definitione metaphysically alien to facts is committing the fallacy of petitio 
principi as well. From the neonaturalistic perspective, the ontological modality of a state-of-affairs 
being a value does not consist in the meta-oughtness of its being the non-fulfilled obligation  
to be actualized, but the modality consists in the obligation for the state to come into real existence. 
Duty (resp. a norm) can only be derived from being, or from the empirical fact that a given  
state-of-affairs has been valued. Values have the status of real processual states-of-affairs,  
but not autonomous substances. 
Neonaturalism neither reduces axiological qualities to empirical ones nor derives moral 
judgments from the statements of non-moral facts, but it proposes the ontological interpretation  
of normativity (value-status) of empirical facts. The normative states-of-affairs do not exist  
in a non-empirical way and only the empirical can become the normative. The status of being  
a value is a particular normative way (valuableness) of the proceeding of an empirical fact
4
.  
                                                   
 
 
2  The well known and widely discussed example of such a scheme of normative reasoning we owe  
to J. Searle; see (Searle 1969: 175-198) and (Hare 1967). It should be noted that J. Searle, S. Toulmin  
and Ph. Foot, who initiated argument about the dogma of  post-Wittgenstein linguistic philosophy that  
the meaning of an expression can be identified with its usage,  were the pioneers of  the moderate 
neonaturalistic trend in meta-ethics (Wawrzyniak, 2000: 21-22) 
3  For the understanding of the terms „valued”, „valuable”, “value-able”, “value-abilty”, “valuabilty”, 
 see (Wawrzyniak 2000: 221-227) 
4 Value is an ontic category whereas valuableness is an ontological one. Values are unstable relational states-
of-affairs, going on in time and composed of an actively valuing subject (a valuer), a valued object (that can 
be a living creature as well), and a relation (ontic interdependence) between them; this is every relation  
in which the subject wishes or does not wish – in result of valuation which is a sui generis emotional  
and instinctive experience – to find itself with the object (or with a state he want/does not want to participate 
in). The living source of valuation is an internal constitutive element of a value. Valuation itself creates 
valuableness (positive or negative), but not the physical existence of a value. The actualization of valued 
states-of-affairs is not identical with valuation but is induced by it. But the real existence itself of anything 
does not make this valued. If a factually existing material set becomes valued (and called a value),  
its physical (ontic) status does not change; it does not acquire any new objective properties, however  
it becomes non-indifferent to the subject that reacts toward this set with a valuation act. 
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In neonaturalism, a differnce betwen “being” and “oughtnes” is interpetd as the difernce 
between the actual and intentional-prospective existence of a valued state-of-affairs.  
The neonaturalistic ontolgy makes it posible to drive “duty” (norms) from “being”  
(is-statements) because it identifies the value with the state of actual being and recognizes the 
valuableness (normativity) of physical being as such. There is no oughtness beyond the empirical 
world, and there exists only one reality of facts, among which some are valued. The very process  
of making an intentional valued state-of-affairs actual, or the process of fulfilling an obligation,  
is - as an element of axiological situation - a valued fact, and the oughtness of being (lasting)  
of an intended value does not vanish together with its actualization
5
. 
The axiological non-indifference of the empirically experienced reality provides  
for the necessary condition of a reasonable formulation of normative postulates. Indeed, we used  
to postulate for either a change (in case of devaluation) or preservation (while valuation is positive)  
of the hitherto proceeding states of empirical reality which are non-indifferent to us. It is a fallacy 
to conclude a norm from the statement of a non-normative fact, but not on the basis of an 
evaluation, which as such, is an is-proposition, denoting approvals/disapprovals of a state-of-affairs 
on account of which existence the norm (to change or to preserve) is formulated. 
If ethics is to change the world efficiently, it must both act within the framework of the world‟s 
nomological order and treat the factual as valuable. Without the identification of the normative 
with the factual (resp. the relativization of norms to given facts taken as a values) any discourse 
that employs norms, evaluations, orders, prescriptions, persuasions – especially ethical – makes  
no sense. Our wishes and ideas assume real axiological indifference to a state-of-affairs  
to which they propose any alternatives. And without he “location” of asource of valuation within 
the structure of a value, empirical facts would remain purely non-axiological, to which normative 
qualites would have to be “atached” from a difernt universe. And if the source had  
no subjective-personal status, the preformed values-in-themselves would remain noncommittal  
to any subject which, therefore, would merely have the status of an external observer
6
. The norm, 
or a judgment articulating oughtness, is a consequence of the non-indifference 
(approval/disapproval) of a living valuer towards the state-of-affairs within which this valuer  
has found itself
7
. 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
 
Valuableness of a value, actively conferred on the world by creatures able to value, is the relation of sui generis 
emotional non-idifference of a valuer toward a particular configuration of empirical qualities, and not  
a passive reception of separate value-entities. The correlation of certain configurations with valuing reactions, 
which motivate behavior, is teleonomic (adaptively functional) and these configurations are key stimuli  
in releasing valuation. Innate valuational adjustment of organisms to configurations such as vital values,  
or the attributes as well as necesary conditions to be a living being, are motivations inducing the defense  
of these values. Instinctive (apetitive-consumatory), reactional (relational) status of valuation constitutes the state 
of axiolocation, in which organisms must remain while fighting for survival. They scour the environment  
for the natural stimuli releasing valuation. Axiolocation make it possible for them to get oriented  
in the environment and creates a real hierarchy of importance among its elements. Axiological reactivity is an 
attribute of the cognitive activity of organisms in the environment; see (Wawrzyniak 2000: 21, 93-101, 180-183). 
5 For the notion of axiological (normative) situation see: (Wawrzyniak 2000: 175-176). 
6  In neonaturalistic axiology, the active agent of valuation as well as cognition is the evolutionary 
transcendental (panspecific) subject (valuer)- TS - or Living Being as such. This abstract category  represents 
the biocommunity of values. TS is the exclusive and complete source of valuation, and owing to TS there exists 
only one naturally valued world. Values are actualized and reproduced by TS, of whose value-ability  
has emerged in the evolutionary process of natural selection. The category of TS – as an ontological as well as 
normative construction – enables us to meet methodological standards (e.g. the open question argument, which 
ethical notions are subject to, as well as the universalizability of ought-statements) that G. E. Moore, D. Hume, 
and I. Kant addressed to ethical claims. Mutual understanding within the realm of values, and thus within  
the cultural space of communication (interpersonal, social, intercultural and interspecific, verbal as well as non-
verbal), is possible due to the biocommunity – embodied by the TS – of the codes of axiological reactions;  
see (Moore 1956: ch. I-II, IV), (Wawrzyniak 2000: 20-21, 205-211). 
7 A given value is always meta-valued positively in relation to less or not accepted alternatives, and this value 
is, during the period of its proceeding, becoming meta-valued negatively in relation to more preferred 
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4 Naturalistic Fallacy and Naturalistic Fallacy Fallacy 
In the presented version of meta-ethical neonaturalism – which is more radical than J. Searle‟s 
position expressed in his Speech Acts – some judgments of valued brute facts provide for necessary 
normative premises of ought-conclusions. If we assume that values are, by definition, what should 
(resp. should not) be, then the existential judgments of values (judgments finding the existence  
of valued brute facts), which as such are is-statements, can serve as necessary normative premises 
(obligation-premises) in the derivation of duty orders or prescriptions. The evaluative statement,  
or the evaluation proper, presupposes an existential value-judgment. In the procedure  
of justification of normative conclusions they logically function as two different judgments; 
however both of them are crucial to validate a norm of human conduct. The evaluative statement 
qualifies the identified valued state-of-affairs as positive or negative. The judgment  
of value is necessary in order to infer a norm in general, whereas an evaluation statement 
determines whether a norm is a prohibition or an order. The oughtness-related premises of ethical 
norms are, therefore, the conjunctions of existential-value judgments and evaluative statements 
(classifying the identified valued facts as positive or negative). Prohibitions and orders are  
the logical and practical consequences of the identification of a valued (positively or negatively) 
state-of-affairs which they refer to; in practice, however, they can also be justified in the so-called 
thetic way, i.e. on account of the very fact of their being institutionally set up and introduced
8
. 
Some brute facts are, at the same time, institutional and linguistic ones (e.g. promises), and the 
binding status of certain speech acts (especially performative utterances) does not result either from 
grammar or logic but from the very social fact of these acts being arisen,  
i.e. of the usage of staements of definte content. The axiolgical charcter of the “instiution”  
of promisng (comitng oneslf) as wel as keping one‟s promise is a brute social fact.  
In the wel known Searle‟s argumentaion, already the very brute fact of a promise being voiced, 
which is a locution denoted by the first premise of the argumentation, is axiologically relevant; 
however it is not an institutional fact yet
9
. The promise is the performative utterance  
and – as a normative illocution – can only be actualized in an extra-verbal context, and its 
axiological status comes from the brute social fact of its coming into existence
10
. A normative as 
well as linguistic fact of promising is the ought-consequence of a valuableness of a state-of-affairs 
(a value in spe) that is being promised. The locution of promise ought to be performed because 
what is being promised ought to be promised. 
An institutional fact is not always justified in an axiological way (i.e. by the reference  
to values). The acts of administrative decisions create the type of thetic norms, of which binding 
power can be questioned by the reference to values which are alternative ones in relation  
to the values which are implicitly hidden behind these norms. Neither an act itself  
of the determination of a norm nor a fact of its common observance can be axiologically (morally 
in particular) obligatory to an addressee of this norm; and, at the same time, a fact that a given type 
of human conduct is not forbidden by law does not mean that this conduct is morally acceptable.  
From the other side, the status of being a value, attributed to certain institutional facts, does  
not result from their being institutional. Health is a value not because it is legally protected,  
but it is protected because it is a brute valued fact. The attribution of axiological status exclusively 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
alternatives. The fact that what is really existing is being unaccepted – in relation to its alternatives –  
and it should not exist longer does not mean that it is not a value any more. It is quite the opposite:  
it is a not wanted fact, which ought to be replaced by a more preferred one. The distinction between facts 
and values is – in its essence – an axiological operation and consists in negative meta-valuation of actually 
existing values, see (Wawrzyniak 2000: 268-277) 
8 See (Ossowska 1966: 72-83, 126-142, 147-167 ), (Znamierowski 1957: 22-228, 391-393) 
9
 (Searle 1969: 177-178, 182) 
10
 The promise is always made from the TS-level  (see the footnote num. 6) embodying cultural conventions, 
so even if a particular speaking subject is insincere, the promise itself is valid and binding. 
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to institutional facts, proves that J. Searle could not overcome the limitation on the realm of values 
to the sphere of human cultural activity. 
Norms (ought-propositions), as linguistic creations, do not generate their validity themselves. 
The axiological binding force of a norm results from its origin in value, whereas the validity  
of thetic norms is conditioned by cultural imprinting or forcing under the threat of punishment  
for disobedience to them. Both the axiological and thetic binding force (imperativeness) of norms 
is of extra-linguistic origin. The axiological, thetic, and logical validity of norms are three different 
modalities of validity, of which only the axiological one is peculiar to moral discourse.  
The logically correct inference of a norm does not itself make for the moral validation 
(justification) of this norm. The type of validity of a norm depends on the axiological status  
of its origin (premises) and content. The means of argumentation for or against a norm  
is crucial. 
Axiological (i.e. referred to value preferences) as well as moral problems are not solvable  
by formalized languages (e.g. modal logic systems), because they are not reducible to the issue  
of adherence to logical discipline of reasoning. There arises then the necessity to create such  
a language of axiology and meta-ethics which would render the real (i.e. axiological  
and not secondary-deontological) origin of validity (binding status) of moral norms. The metaethics 
of radical neonaturalism justifies norms – not rejecting, however, the device of formal logic  
as an linguistic code for the introduction of moral postulates into social circulation – also through 
the reference to extralinguistic and non-institutional brute valued facts (e.g. biological ones). 
Searle identifies valuation proper, or a unique emotional process, with "valuations" as they are 
understood in logic or economy, as well as with the usage of evaluation-making predicates
11
.  
The axiolgical understanding of logical, or linguistic operations alows him to “find” the solution 
to  the naturalistic fallacy not having to get conceptually beyond the practice of social use  
of language. The usage of subject complements or adverbials, which sound and are read identically 
in logic, epistemology, economy, praxeology, aesthetics or moral discourse, creates  
an appearance that the meanings as well as functions (illocutionary force) of these expressions 
remain unchanged in those particular contexts, which, in turn, confirms a false conviction that  
a system of a modal (especialy deontic) logic embodies the “logic” of the valuation proces  
as such. J. Searle recognized too wide a range of similarly sounding phrases as utterances reporting 
valuation proper. 
There is such a significant degree of autonomy of usage itself attributed to speech that  
it creates its own realm of abstract semantic references, which is conducive to recognizing the rules 
of competent usage of a language as laws ruling the spheres of reality of which explanation  
is performed in this language. It seems as if J. Searle was under the delusion that the language  
of axiology has its own universal semantics, and that particular terms do not change their meanings 
and functions when the extralinguistic contexts of their usage is changed. While focusing – in his 
criticism of the dogmatic identification of usage with meaning (which was claimed by the post-
Wittgenstein linguistic philosophy) – on illocutionary differences of the usage of words, Searle 
absolutized the category of meaning. He believed that the naturalistic fallacy fallacy is of purely 
lingusitic nature and consists in confusing the difference of illocutionary force (ways of use  
or functions) of utterances with the difference of their logical status (truth conditions or meanings); 
the latter makes the implication from descriptive proposition to a normative judgment really 
impossible
12
. 
I think that language itself is not a sufficient and even proper realm for the solution of the is-
ought problem, because the issue of deduction between propositions, differing in logical status, 
does not render the ontological particularities (modalities) of the states-of-affairs denoted by these 
propositions. Empirical reality is too complex for systems of formalized languages to reconstruct 
its status quo. In particular, language itself does not value, that is to say, it does not create  
                                                   
 
11 For the ontic status of valuation see (Wawrzyniak 2000: 84, 93-101, 211-221) 
12 (Searle 1969: 42-50, 132-136) 
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the valuableness of anything; neither do logical operations generate oughtness as such; they only 
introduce duties (in the form of normative judgments) into social consciousness. Evaluation (which 
is a linguistic act) cannot be identified with valuation (which is a spiritual operation sui generis). 
An evaluative statement only reports or transfers  the results of valuation, which does not have  
to assume a form of linguistic expression. Telling the truth is an act of actualization of the value  
of truth by means of a linguistic act, but the act itself does not create the valuableness of the truth.  
The radical version of neonaturalism differs from the position of Searle in claiming that  
the naturalistic fallacy fallacy (NFF) is of extralinguistic nature and in looking for the possibility  
of deriving ought-conclusions from is-propositions (existential value-judgments and evaluations), 
which is to be found neither in the semantics of ethical terminology nor pragmatics of normative 
discourse but within the sphere of the ontology of values. I think that the NFF and methodological 
difficulties connected with normative reasoning are caused by: (1) the conceptual dualizing  
of Being into the separate sub-spheres of real facts and abstract-ideal non-realities called 
“values”13 ; and (2) the ontological interpretation of formalized language, consisting  
in the identification of principles of logical inference both with the real processes of valuation  
and the human acts of conscience-determined committing oneself. 
4.1 G.E. More’s tandpoint 
The so-called naturalistic fallacy (NF) proceeds on two levels: the ontological analyzed  
by G. E. Moore, and the linguistic (logical) one indicated by David Hume. Moore asserted that no 
semantic equivalence of ethical and empirical terms existed due to the difference of ontological 
status of qualities that were denoted by these two types of terms. This was a consequence  
of the xtreme abstract realism of the More‟s axiolgy within the ontolgical dualism of acts  
and values
14
. If so, then Moore also recognized certain non-natural facts (real beings)  
as axiological qualities, and therefore he himself did not avoid the ontological mutation of what  
he caled NF, and what W. Frankena named “moralistic falacy”, meanig aconceptual operation 
performed by Moore, the one consisting in making substance or actual being of pure normativity 
(resp. valuableness)
15
. It seems that in Moore's ontology, the valuableness (resp. oughtness),  
or goodness/badness – understood as a simple, indefinable property, irreducible to its empirical 
correlates – becomes a purely logical, Pythagorean-like category. 
G.E. Moore suggests some approximations of the essence of NF: 
(i) the identification of empirical attributes of good objects with the quality denoted  
by the “god”; 
(ii) the equation (reduction) of the normative quality (resp. intrinsic value) denoted  
by the adjective “god” and real – empirical or metaphysical – properties which are not 
normative in themselves; 
(iii) the confusion of non-natural objects (resp. qualities) with natural ones; 
(iv) the identifcation of what is imple, like the denotaion of the “god” with the complex 
state-of-afairs like “conducive to the survial of a species” or “suposed to be god  
by the majority of rationaly thinking people”. 
The above-mentioned ontological distinctions generate: 
(v) the impossibility for ethical qualities (normative as well as simple) be defined  
in non-ethical terminology (e.g. in terms of natural sciences, social sciences or theology) 
which can only denote sub-universe of non-normative facts; 
                                                   
 
13 (Nozick 1981: 535-539) 
14 Let us note that naturalists and metaphysicians commit the naturalistic fallacy only from the perspective  
of the ontology assumed by the More‟s intuitonism. They themselves remain cohernt while defing 
ethical terms within their own ontologies. (Moore 1956: 61-64) (Frankena 1967: 59-60) 
15 (Frankena 1967: 61) 
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A final result is: 
(vi) the impossibility of deducing ethical (normative) conclusions from the premises  
not referred to the subuniverse of values (oughtness) 
While analyzing, by means of analogy, the defintional staus of “god”, “yelow”, “pleasnt” 
and “supersensible (etrnal) reality” More finds that “even if the quality denoted by „god‟ wer  
a natural object, hat would not alter the nature of the falacy…a whit” as wel as that “to be god” 
does not mean “to have supersensible properties”16 . It seems, therefore, that the NF, which  
can more xactly be caled a“a trap of realism”, can be understod as adefinst falacy consiting 
in defining or explaining a sphere of experienced reality by means of language and laws belonging 
to and fitting a nomologically different range of Being. However, the definist fallacy results from 
the ontolgical restriction, consiting in identifcation of the quality denoted by the “god” with  
a unique normative substantive being
17. Within the framework of More‟s ontolgy, the defing  
of axiological (normative) categories in semantically strange terminology must reveal the lack  
of translatability. 
From the neonaturalistic perspective the “location” itself of values either within the mpircal 
(sensually detected or theoretically reconstructed) world or supranatural reality as well as  
the intuitionally perceived mental universe neither prevents the NF nor leads to it. It is so because  
this fallacy is, in its essence, the fallacy of metaphysical and, in consequence, definitional  
and methodological reductionism.An example of the fallacy is the reduction – rooted in positivistic 
paradigm – of moral dilemmas to formal-logical issues or verbal operations. And if we a priori 
divide Being into sub-realms of facts and values – as G.E. Moore does – then the logical aspect  
of the NF will be the common consequence of such a division. But if we did not perform such  
an ontological operation, then the is-ought entailment will be logically possible, provided  
the existential judgments of normative empirical facts are employed as necessary premises  
of imperative conclusions (orders, prohibitions, prescriptions). 
5 A neonaturalistic proposal 
Within neonaturalistic ontology, values have the status of particular facts, which means that not 
every fact is valued. Normativity is attributed to no other universe than the natural one, because 
values and facts belong to the same nomological order. A fact can be normative, for ontological 
difference (the way of being) does not mean ontic one (referred to physical characteristics).  
The synonymy (and not only material or formal equivalence) occurs between propositions 
containing the terms which denote empirical normative facts and the ethical judgments, but not 
between normative (e.g. moral) propositions and the statements of non-normative facts. Ethical 
terms can have empirical or theoretical semantic references, for normativity (valuableness) is  
the unique way of being of the empirical, and, as such, can be defined – as for its attributively 
determined existence – in descriptive is-statements. 
Not every is-ought derivation is committing the naturalistic fallacy. The denotation of an is-
premise, or the existential judgment of a fact on account of which a given norm – concerning  
the change or keeping-on this factual state-of-affairs – is formulated, is crucial. Neonaturalism 
recognizes as values such empirical states-of-afairs which comply with the More‟s “open 
question argument”, and thus this philosophical perspective nables the particpants of normative 
discourse to formulate axiological judgments – especially evaluations which represent a particular 
kind of normative is-statements - by means of empirical predicates and to derive norms  
on the basis of these judgments. It is so because they are judgments of particular, normatively 
                                                   
 
16 (Frankena 1967: 56-57), (Moore 1956: 10, 12-13, 120-125); let us notice that in More‟s meta-ethics, 
axiological definitions are analytical as well as designative (projective), and they do not treat of the existence 
itself of good/bad objects. 
17
 In the reasoning quoted by W. Frankena - <if [a] pleasure is sought by all men, and [b] what is sought  
by all men is good (by definition), therefore [c] pleasure is good> - in order to prove that the NF is not  
a logical one, the second premise involves the NF in definitional sense; (Frankena 1967: 54) 
Jan Wawrzyniak: The Logical Discipline of Normative Argumentation. 
Some considerations on the axiological status of speech acts 
 204 
relevant facts, or of what ought – from the very definition of a value (resp. the state of oughtness) – 
to come (resp. not to come) into real being and to last. Therefore they have a logical status  
of judgments of obligation and lead to ought-instructions, or norms and prescriptions. These are 
values which generate and determine obligations. In neonaturalistic perspective, the ontological 
profile of the world, especially the relational valuability of Being, determines practical normative 
solutions, including the methodological discipline of reasoning to be applied in moral discourse. 
A simplified scheme <1-5.1> of an is-ought reasoning concluded with a norm could seem  
as follows: 
1. <X is obligatory (is ordered) to be actualized or X is obligatory (is banned/prohibited)  
not to be actualized (not to come into real being) if and only if X is a value>. 
2. <X is α/¬α and there is good/bad to be (not to be) α/¬α>. This proposition is a conjunction 
of the predicate “X is α” and the existential evaluative staement “it is god/bad  
to be α/¬α”. 
3. <If X is α/ ¬α), then X is a positive/negative value>. 
Wher „α‟ is denoting any empirical attributes or state-of-affairs that used to be 
praised/reproved (e.g., just, clever, noble, disgusting, nasty, criminal) in a given society, whereas 
„¬a‟ denotes the absence of thes atributes. If „α‟ is acepted, then „¬α‟ is not acepted  
(is negatively indifernt”) and vice versa. 
4. Any set of descriptive propositions which provide good reasons for a normative 
conclusion. In particular, they can be the propositions of the, e.g. feasibility, profitability 
or rightness (“right” is here meant as “the best of al posible options”) of avalued X that 
is to be actualized, as well as the assertions of necessary means/devices to act efficiently 
for the sake of X. For example: <X is accomplishable (resp. unaccomplishable) as α>. 
5. Therefore: for every agent recognizing premises <1-4> it is obliged to realize  
(keep on existing) / not to realize X. This is a final norm which meets the requirement  
of universalizability addressed to ethical judgments of obligation. 
5.1. There follow bans or orders to change / to keep on the state X, which are addressed  
to individual agents: <you ought/ought not to act as it is indicated in the content of 5>. 
From the neonaturalistic perspective, the “comitng” of the analyzed “falacy” sems  
to be a condicio sine qua non for the normative ethics being constructed. The real reasons  
of thinking that formal logic is the only instrument of moral justification are cultural preferences. 
Behind such a defense for formal-logical validation within the sphere of morality the identification 
of logic with a proper – because typically human – language of moral argumentation is hidden.  
By defending the purely logical nature of moral justification Homo sapiens defends human 
language as the only means of cognition and communication of values. Language is comprehended  
as a product as well as a symbol of human culture, which is supposed – in common conviction –  
to be the only realm of values. The going out of a system of formalized language in the procedure 
of normative justification is supposed to be a hardly acceptable leaving (or even the betrayal of)  
the human species‟ culture. Through the claiming of the imposiblity of is-ought inference, 
humans defend their self-distinguished status in evolution, or defend themselves against moral 
evaluation of their own species‟ stay on the Earth. The naturalistic falacy falacy is ametaphysical 
fallacy, consisting – in its axiological essence – in setting the world of nature against the world  
of culture, or in restricting the realm of values to cultural phenomena, which as such is generated 
by speciesism. 
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